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Abstract—Effects of radiation on electronic circuits used in extra-terrestrial applications and radiation prone environments need
to be corrected. Since FPGAs offer flexibility, the effects of radiation on them need to be studied and robust methods of fault
tolerance need to be devised. In this paper a new fault-tolerant design strategy has been presented. This strategy exploits the
relation between changes in inputs and the expected change in output. Essentially, it predicts whether or not a change in the
output is expected and thereby calculates the error. As a result this strategy reduces hardware and time redundancy required by
existing strategies like Duplication with Comparison (DWC) and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). The design arising from this
strategy has been simulated and its robustness to fault-injection has been verified. Simulations for a 16 bit multiplier show that the
new design strategy performs better than the state-of-the-art on critical factors such as hardware redundancy, time redundancy
and power consumption.
Index Terms—Fault-tolerance, Reliability, Redundant Design, Triple Modular Redundancy, Single Event Upset.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE ever-increasing desire of man to explore theextra-terrestrial space around him, to study and
use it for mankind’s better future, has given rise to
a remarkable development on the space technology
front in the last five decades. The technical think-
tanks behind these developments have often had to
face extraordinary challenges. One of these challenges
is the vulnerability of electronic circuits used in space
systems to powerful space radiations [1]. Circuits used
in space applications need to be protected from effects
of such radiation. Closer home, radiation resistant
circuitry is required for nuclear reactors and other
radiation prone environments [25].
Full-custom hardware design (also known as Ap-
plication Specific Integrated Circuits - ASICs) and
Semi-custom hardware design (also known as Field
Programmable Gate Arrays - FPGAs) are the two
types of hardware that can be used for radiation
prone environments. Though ASICs offer the best per-
formance for space applications, the complexity and
cost involved are very high. Also, the functionality of
ASICs is fixed and it cannot be altered. ASICs are very
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good against SEUs (Single Event Upsets) and they
dominate the space technology market [4], [21]. On
the other hand, FPGAs are reconfigurable devices. The
most commonly used FPGAs are SRAM-based [2].
They offer the flexibility of changing the functionality,
and most importantly, functionality can be modified
on-field during a mission too [3], [21]. But, FPGAs
are weak against SEUs [5], [7], [10], [11]. In the last
decade, studies have been done to correct such errors,
which occur due to radiations on SRAM-based FPGAs
[7], [8], [9], [5], [12]. These studies show that FPGAs
have the potential to outperform ASICs in the space
technology market. Thereby, it becomes necessary to
study the effects of radiation on FPGAs and devise
better fault-tolerant techniques.
The known correction techniques depend on repli-
cation (dual,triple) to provide protection [18], [19],
[22], [20] (and the references therein). In this paper
we present a technique that provides protection based
on logic between the inputs and output(s) of a gate-
hence the name “Input-Output Logic Based (IOLB)”
technique.
The remainder of the paper is organized is follows.
Section 2 reviews radiation effects and existing tech-
niques of fault-tolerance for SRAM based FPGAs. Sec-
tion 3 presents the proposed approach to fault-tolerant
design. Section 4 compares the proposed approach
against the existing techniques. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 REVIEW OF RADIATION EFFECTS ON
SRAM-BASED FPGAS AND CURRENT
TECHNIQUES
In this section we review the effects of radiation on
SRAM-based FPGAs and the Current Techniques used
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
06
02
v2
  [
cs
.A
R]
  5
 N
ov
 20
13
2Fig. 1. SEUs - An Illustration
to ameliorate these efffects.
2.1 Radiation Effects on SRAM-based FPGAs
Due to the effects of the earth’s magnetic field and
solar cycles, radiation doses change from location to
location and time to time. So, a particular technology
may be suitably adopted for a particular location
and at a particular time [14], [15], [16]. Space radia-
tion effects are due to High Energy Electromagnetic
Radiation and Particle radiations. This implies that
Electromagnetic waves of high frequency viz., X-rays,
Gamma rays and fast moving subatomic particles viz.,
neutrons, protons will affect SRAM-based FPGAs [5],
[6], [13].
Broadly, the space radiation effects can be classified
into Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Event Upset
(SEU). TID is the long-term damage done to the
electronic circuitry due to electrons and protons. It is
a permanent effect and it causes defects in the semi-
conductor lattice. Its effects are functional failures,
leakage current and threshold shifts in CMOS [17].
SEU or soft error is a transient fault which may cause
glitches i.e., current pulses, to propagate through the
circuits. These glitches can be mitigated or corrected
by design strategies. As shown in Fig. 1, in an SEU,
ionization radiation loses its energy when it strikes the
silicon in an electronic device due to the production
of free electron-hole pairs. Also, protons, neutrons and
gamma rays can give rise to nuclear reactions when
passing through a material. Ionization due to this
generates large amounts of charge which is observed
as a transient current pulse. Ohlsson et al. studied and
analyzed the effect of neutrons in a Xilinx FPGA [11].
In [22], Kastensmidt et al. point out that FPGAs are
becoming more susceptible to neutrons as transistor
size is decreasing and logic density increasing.
In SRAM-based FPGAs, customizable memory cells
(SRAM cells), implement both the users combina-
tional and sequential logic.
When a SEU occurs in the combinational logic
(synthesized in the FPGA), it corresponds to a bit flip
in one of the LUTs cells or in the cells that control
the routing. A SEU in an LUT memory cell modifies
the implemented combinational logic while an upset
in the routing can connect or disconnect a wire in
the matrix. The configuration bitstream’s next load
corrects both these faults.
An SEU in the user sequential logic synthesized in
the FPGA, has a transient effect because the next load
corrects it. An SEU in the embedded block RAM has a
permanent effect and fault tolerance techniques must
correct it.
A fault-tolerant system for a SRAM-based FPGAs,
must cope with the transient and permanent effects
of an SEU in the combinational logic, short and open
circuits in the design connections, and bit flips in the
flip-flops and memory cells[22].
Radiation tests on Xilinx FPGAs, for aerospace ap-
plications, have proven the need to use fault-tolerance
schemes (for circuits) [23]. In [22], it is argued that
protecting FPGAs by the use of redundancy is a lot
more cost-effective as opposed to designing a new
FPGA matrix of fault-tolerant elements. They move
on to propose a fault-tolerant technique that employs
time and hardware redundancy.
In [18], Wakerly attempted at applying Triple Mod-
ular Redundancy (TMR) concepts towards improving
microcomputer reliability. In [19], Carmichael applied
TMR methodology to Virtex FPGA series. For high-
level SEU mitigation, the technique used most often
today to protect designs synthesized in the Virtex
architecture is based mainly on TMR combined with
scrubbing [22]. In [20], Kastensmidt et al. proposed
two new schemes that reduced the redundancy from
three in the TMR design to two. In this paper, we
present the Input-Output Logic Based (IOLB) method
that eliminates the need for even the existing dual
redundancy.
2.2 Triple Modular Redundancy
In TMR method, each pin, wire and block are tripli-
cated and a majority voting is done to determine the
correct output. The basic idea is depicted in Fig. 2. An
illustration of the majority voter circuit is presented in
Fig. 3. The area overhead in TMR technique is more
than 3 times that of the standard circuit. It does not
correct all the upsets. The upsets will accumulate if
there is no extra logic for the refreshing. So typically,
scrubbing is done (scrubbing is the process of repro-
gramming the FPGA periodically to ensure that faults
do not accumulate) [18], [19]. Also, there are a variety
of ways in which TMR can be applied to a circuit. In
[20], a comparison of the performance of these various
ways is presented.
3Fig. 2. TMR with a Majority Voter Block
Fig. 3. Majority Voter Circuit
Note that scrubbing lets a system repair SEUs in the
configuration memory without disrupting operations
(for correcting the voter logic). The scrubbing cycle
time depends on the configuration clock frequency
and the readback bitstream size [20].
Overall, the TMR technique has limitations such
as high area overhead, three times more input and
output pins, and a significant increase in power dis-
sipation.
2.3 Duplication with Comparison (DWC) and Time
Redundancy
In this method, dual hardware and time redundancy
concepts are used as presented in Fig. 4 for arriving
at the quartet (Tc0, Hc, Tc1, Hcd). The two redundant
blocks used are labeled as combinational logic 0 (cl0)
and combinational logic 1 (cl1). If an upset occurs in
cl0, then Tc0 and Hcd will be ’1’ and Tc1 and Hc
will be ’0’. Similarly, an upset in cl1 can be detected
when Tc1 and Hcd are ’1’ and Tc0 and Hc are ’0’.
Using this information, a state machine is designed
to perform the voting of fault-free block. But when
Tc0 is 0, Tc1 is 1, Hc is 0 and Hcd is 1, there is
no way to predict the faulty block. For this reason,
DWC with time redundancy may fail to correct stuck-
at-zero and stuck-at-one faults as pointed in [20].
This led to the advent of DWC CED, which modifies
time redundancy technique used in DWC with Time
redundancy, to detect the permanent effect of an SEU.
2.4 DWC with Concurrent Error Detection
This method employs DWC along with Concurrent
Error Detection (CED) to detect the location of the er-
ror. This method uses encode and decode functions (as
Fig. 4. DWC combined with Time Redundancy [20]
Fig. 5. DWC-CED technique [20]
illustrated in Fig. 5) to re-compute the input operands.
These functions are chosen in such a way that the
output due to the re-computed operands differs from
that of the original operands in the presence of an
error. The voting circuit is presented in Fig. 6. Say
there is an error in block 0. Then, Tc0 will be 1 and
Hc will also be 1. From the state diagram of the voter
circuitry presented in [22], it can be seen that it first
enters the Upset Detection state as Hc is 1. From there,
it enters the state dr1 is fault-free, since Tc0 is 1. It is
worth noting that there must not be upsets in more
than one redundant module, including the detection
and voting circuits for faithful functioning.
In both TMR and DWC-CED , scrubbing corrects
upsets in the user’s combinational logic, and the CLB
flip-flops TMR scheme corrects upsets in the users se-
quential logic. Scrubbing must be continuous to guar-
antee that only one upset has occurred between two
reconfigurations in the design. As such, the scrubbing
rate should be fast enough to avoid the accumulation
of upsets in two different redundant blocks. Upsets in
the detection and voting circuit don’t interfere with
the system’s proper execution because the logic is
duplicated and the logics latches are refreshed every
clock cycle [22].
3 THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
The motivation of the proposed Input-Output Logic
Based (IOLB) method is to reduce on the dual hard-
4Fig. 6. Voting the correct block [20]
ware redundancy and time redundancy of the state-
of-the-art DWC-CED scheme. The new strategy ex-
ploits the relation between changes in inputs and
expected changes in output. Such an approach to
predicting an expected output is novel and has not
been reported hitherto. Our strategy does not require
explicit duplication or triplication of the combina-
tional logic block to detect and correct an error.
The proposed design methodology assesses if the
output is expected to change following a change in the
input(s). These signals (changes in inputs and change
in output) are used along with appropriately designed
logic to generate the error signal, which can then be
XOR-ed with the output signal to yield the error-free
output. Like in TMR and DWC-CED, scrubbing needs
to be employed to correct upsets in combinational
logic and TMR needs to be employed to correct upsets
in sequential logic.
3.1 NOT Gate
We shall now consider the case of a NOT gate to
illustrate the mechanism involved in designing the
IOLB correction circuit. Say A is its input and B is
its output. In an error-free scenario, if A is ’1’, then B
would be ’0’. However, say A is now changed to ’0’
(due to a SEU) and there is no accompanied change
in B (that is, it stays at ’0’). Then, that will mean that
there is an error, since, in a NOT gate, a change in
input is expected to bear a change in the output too.
Let us now examine a couple of other cases of
input-output pair transitions. If the pair (format: ’AB’)
changes from ’01’ to ’00’, this means that the output
change has occurred without there being a change in
the input. This is again unexpected behavior for a
normal NOT gate. Similar would have been the case,
if the pair transitioned from ’10’ to ’11’.
These above relations form the central idea to de-
signing the error correcting circuit. Suppose Ac is
change in the input, Bc is the change in the output and
E is the error signal. We can arrive at the following
TABLE 1
NOT Gate: Generating E
Ac Bc E
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
Fig. 7. Block diagram of IOLB NOT gate
truth table from the above inferences drawn about
relations between the change in input and the change
in output. In Table 1, in the first case, if there is no
change in the input and the output (syndrome ’00’),
there is no error. If there is no change in the input
but there is a change in the output (syndrome ’01’),
there is an error. Similarly, rest of the syndromes can
be tracked.
For the computation of changes in variables, we
take the XOR of a variable with a delayed version of
itself, thereby giving us ’1’ if there has been a change.
The value of the delay is arbitrary. While trying to
compute Bc from B, we need to take care of the
possibility of an error having occurred in the NOT
gate. If we just perform XOR of delayed and current
values of B, we will get an erroneous Bc if the NOT
gate is error-affected (since B would be erroneous).
Hence, if the error signal E is ’1’ (indicating that the
NOT gate is affected), we take XOR with the NOT of
delayed B for the computation of Bc. A block diagram
of IOLB NOT gate is illustrated in Fig. 7 and the IOLB
circuit for NOT gate is shown in Fig 8.
3.2 Exclusive OR (XOR) Gate
We now consider the case of a two-input XOR gate.
Say A and B are its inputs and S is its output. In an
error free scenario, if both A and B are same, then S
would be ’0’ and if both are different then S would
be ’1’. However, in case both A and B are same and
S is ’1’ or in case both A and B are different and S
is ’0’, that would mean there is an error. Such a case
will arise when an expected output change does not
succeed a change in an input/ when an unexpected
output change occurs, even without a change in the
inputs. We shall now look at specific instances of the
above cases.
5Fig. 8. Circuit diagram of IOLB NOT gate
TABLE 2
XOR Gate: Generating E
Ac Bc Sc E
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
Say the current state (format: ’ABS’) is ’000’. Sup-
pose a transition occurs from ’000’ to ’100’, this is un-
expected because, in an XOR gate, output is expected
to change following a change in exactly one of the
input. Suppose a transition occurs from ’000’ to ’001’,
this is again unexpected, since in an XOR gate, the
output cannot change without a change in its inputs.
Henceforth, we shall use c-subscripted symbols to
denote changes in variables. For instance, Xc denotes
change in the variable X. In other words, Xc=’1’ means
there has been a change in X and Xc=’0’ means there
hasn’t been a change in X.
In table 2, in the first case, there is no change in
either of the inputs and there is no change in the
output. Hence, the error (denoted as E) is zero. In
the second case, there is no change in either of the
inputs, but there is a change in the output. As has
been discussed above, this is unexpected and hence
there is an error (E = ’1’). In the third case, exactly
one of the inputs has changed and hence the output
is expected to change. But it hasn’t changed (since Sc
= ’0’) and hence there is an error ( E = ’1’). Rest of the
cases can be seen tracked from truth table in a similar
fashion.
From Table 2, it can be inferred that E = Ac (xor)
Bc (xor) Sc.
For arriving at changes in variables, we take the
XOR of a variable and its delayed version. However,
like in the case of NOT gate, the computation of Sc
is not straightforward. We resolve the problem in the
same way as was done in the case of NOT gate: in
the computation of Sc, we use NOT of delayed S if
E = ’1’.
For producing the fault-free output, the error signal
E is XOR-ed with S. A complete picture is illustrated
Fig. 9. Block Diagram of IOLB XOR gate
Fig. 10. Circuit Diagram of IOLB XOR gate
in Fig 9 and the IOLB circuit for XOR gate is shown
in Fig 10.
One may think that in IOLB, for a single XOR gate,
there is an addition of 5 XOR gates and 1 multiplexer.
But it should be noted that TMR would have a six-fold
increase (refer Fig. 11) in resources when looked at for
a single XOR gate. TMR also requires triplication of
inputs. For the DWC-CED method too, the resources
required would be 5 XOR Gates + 4 Encode, 2 Decode
Blocks + 4 multiplexers, 2 Flip-Flops and additional
voter circuitry (refer Fig. 12).
3.3 General Procedure
Consider any logic gate with X1, X2, X3...Xn as inputs
and Y as the output. Like earlier, let Ac denote change
in a variable A. If Ac is 1, there has been a change
in A and if Ac is 0, there has been no change in
A. We first obtain the changes in the input variables
(X1,c, X2,c, X3,c...Xn,c) (labeled as change variables)
by XOR-ing X1, X2, X3...Xn with their delayed ver-
sions. Likewise, we also obtain Yc from Y . Then, we
analyze all possible cases of input-output transitions.
There would be 22n+2 cases, because given an input
state, there are 2n possible transitions (since there are
’n’ change variables) and the number of input states
is itself 2n (since there are ’n’ input variables). Also,
the output Y and its change variable Yc contribute to
22 states.
The next step involves generating the error vari-
able E, which indicates whether or not there
is an error. We arrive at a truth table us-
6Fig. 11. Error correction: TMR for a XOR gate
Fig. 12. DWC-CED for a XOR gate [20]
ing X1, X2, X3...Xn, X1,c, X2,c, X3,c...Xn,c, Y, Yc (la-
beled as error inputs) and estimate the error variable
E in each of the 22n+2 cases. After the error variable
E’s column in the truth table is completed, E is
expressed as a function of the error inputs. Sometimes,
as witnessed in the above cases of NOT and XOR, the
state where the transition began does not matter in
generating E, only the transitions itself matter. So, we
look for such potential redundancies and formulate
an expression for the error variable E. The general
expression can be presented as,
E = f(X1, X2, X3...Xn, X1,c, X2,c, X3,c...Xn,c, Y, Yc)
After the error variable E is obtained, the output Y
is XOR-ed with E to generate the error-free output F .
4 COMPARISON
A 16-bit multiplier has been implemented using the
IOLB strategy presented above. The IOLB circuits for
AND and OR gates also have been arrived at, using
the above strategy. Each of the logic gates in the
cascaded multiplier were replaced with their full IOLB
counterparts. We evaluated our method by testing it
against fault-injection and the percentage of corrected
faults was found to be 100%. Just like in [22], we
utilized 4x1 fault-injection multiplexers for emulating
stuck-at-zero and stuck-at-one faults. A comparison
TABLE 3
Comparison of utilized resources
Technique I/O Pads 4-input LUTs Flip-flops
None 67 495 32
TMR 201 1709 96
DWC-CED [22] 169 1706 162
IOLB 137 1536 96
TABLE 4
TMR Technique
M1 M2 M3 Output
0 0 0 Faithful
0 0 1 Faithful
0 1 0 Faithful
0 1 1 Not faithful
1 0 0 Faithful
1 0 1 Not faithful
1 1 0 Not faithful
1 1 1 Not faithful
TABLE 5
DWC-CED Technique
M1 M2 Output
0 0 Faithful
0 1 Faithful
1 0 Faithful
1 1 Not faithful
TABLE 6
IOLB Technique
M1 Output
0 Faithful
1 Faithful
of the usage of resources by different methods is
presented in Table 3.
As can be seen from Table 3, the proposed design
strategy requires lower hardware resources than do
DWC-CED and TMR. Delay and power consumption
factor could not be compared as we could not gather
the clock frequency that was used in the study pre-
sented in [22]. However, we argue that our technique
will perform better on delay, because there is no
explicit time redundancy like in DWC-CED. Also,
IOLB will do better at power consumption because
of lesser requirement of both hardware resources and
time.
In the event of an SEU, all the three schemes are
error free. However, in TMR there is a possibility that
error can occur in two or more replications. Similarly,
in DWC-CED, there is a possibility that error occurs
in both the replications while in our scheme error can
occur at most in one module. While the scheme of this
paper will correct possible errors, DWC and TMR will
fail for two or more errors. This is elaborated in the
following analysis.
In the Tables 4, 5 and 6, Mi indicates the ith module.
7TABLE 7
Theoretical Analysis: A Summary
Technique Probability of faithful functioning
TMR 1/2
DWC-CED 3/4
IOLB 1
If Mi is 0, then it is fault-free and if Mi is 1, there
is a fault in it. In TMR, a module is triplicated and
a faithful functioning is expected if two of the three
instances are fully free from error. In Table 4, have
identified eight possible scenarios for TMR, each of
which could occur with equal probability.
As can be seen from Table 4, TMR works in 4 out
of the 8 possible cases. This is because two of the
three instances of the module should be fault-free for
a faithful functioning. From Table 5, it can be inferred
that DWC-CED works in 3 out of the 4 possible cases.
This is because DWC-CED works in all cases except
when both the instances of the module (i.e., both M1
and M2) are affected.
We present a similar analysis in Table 6 for IOLB
technique. The IOLB technique uses only one instance
of the original module. If there is a fault in the
module, then the IOLB circuit corrects it. So, in both
cases, a faithful output is obtained. We thus conclude
from our above analysis that IOLB is the least likely
to be affected when compared with TMR and DWC-
CED. A summary of the findings from the above
analysis is presented in Table 7.
5 CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have presented a new strategy
for fault-tolerant design that performs better than
the state-of-the-art. The proposed strategy essentially
provides a mechanism to predict whether or not a
change in the output is expected, as a function of
changes in inputs. For this reason, the utility of this
circuit is not only confined to fault-tolerant design but
also relevant to applications that require information
about whether or not changes in inputs would result
in changes in output(s). Directions for future work
include looking at other application domains where
the proposed strategy can be applied to good effect.
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